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General Subway/RT Discussion


FlyerD901
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I was thinking about McCowan yard the other day and it's future.

Currently there are no plans to utilize it after the SRT shutdown. My best guess is it will be demolished and declared as surplus land.

My idea for it's revitalization is this. As the TTC will be buying 63 additional buses for the replacement bus service (in either 2023 or 2027), why not turn McCowan into an interim bus yard, similar to Obico. Since the divisions are already over capacity, even with McNicoll opening, I think this would be a good short-term solution to the bus storage issues.

Additionally, if and when the Scarborough Subway extension is built, I would like to see McCowan turned into a permanent subway yard, similar to Keele (Vincent) yard. It would house the extra trains procured for the extension.

This revitalization idea is currently part of a project that I am working on. If anyone is interested, I can share updates as it gets further developed. But right now, I'm looking for your insight, opinions and thoughts about this project! Thanks to anyone who responds!

 

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I am glad that the TTC is finally doing full subway shut down for 10 days on part of line 1 instead of doing early shut downs at 11pm.  Hopefully, they will continue doing this while the pandemic is still raging and ridership is way down.  This was they can put a significant dent into their repair back log and get it done much sooner.

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An updated plan for the Yonge North subway extension. 

Especially since they are trying to run adjacent to Richmond Hill Go line along with building above ground and reducing the amount of stations. To try and minimize costs. Even though it is unknown when the Ontario Line will open to shift the demand to and not push Yonge line to capacity during peak periods. Even with the measures such as automated train control and additional trains to squeeze out some more space.

https://blog.metrolinx.com/2021/03/18/updated-plans-for-torontos-yonge-north-subway-extension-released/

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  • 2 months later...

Effective September 7

Durham Region Transit will begin offering service to McCowan RT Station on street every 30 minutes on route 920, a new route connecting McCowan, Centennial College, Sheppard East, Pickering, Ajax, Ajax Amazon Facility, Whitby, Oshawa and Durham College North Campus

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2 hours ago, 110B West Pickering said:

Effective September 7

Durham Region Transit will begin offering service to McCowan RT Station on street every 30 minutes on route 920, a new route connecting McCowan, Centennial College, Sheppard East, Pickering, Ajax, Ajax Amazon Facility, Whitby, Oshawa and Durham College North Campus

How many buses will this route use? Seems pretty long.

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5 hours ago, PCC Guy said:

Alternative link here: https://outline.com/Xb6cR2

9 minutes ago, Doppelkupplung said:

For future reference, if linking a Toronto Star article, use Outline. Here is the link: https://outline.com

Copy and paste the Toronto Star link and it will show the entire article without ads or the paywall. Incognito mode doesn't work sometimes especially if it only works for a few hours once the article is posted. 

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39 minutes ago, TTC103 said:

Is there a link to the video of the incident that doesn’t have a paywall?

I have Apple News, so I was able to bypass the paywall and extract the link here.

NOTE: You CAN only access the video by this link or if someone shares it. It is not searchable because it is set to private.

 

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7 hours ago, IRT_BMT_IND said:

I don't get how the train wasn't tripped when it entered the interlocking, even if there was no ATC on the pocket track.

Might support the claim that the train was in the wrong spot, and the end car’s trip cock was already ahead of the arm when it departed the pocket track.

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9 hours ago, IRT_BMT_IND said:

I don't get how the train wasn't tripped when it entered the interlocking, even if there was no ATC on the pocket track.

Only trip down there would be the blind trip at the end of track in the pocket.

 

The new signalling system doesn't rely on trips. If trains are on the track they are communicating with the signal system, which can activate the emergency brake if it senses something untoward. (The equipment onboard the train can also do calculations on this, and also apply the emergency brakes.)

 

Unless the system's been turned off in a particular area. Which it was there.

 

Dan

 

 

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2 hours ago, smallspy said:

Only trip down there would be the blind trip at the end of track in the pocket.

 

The new signalling system doesn't rely on trips. If trains are on the track they are communicating with the signal system, which can activate the emergency brake if it senses something untoward. (The equipment onboard the train can also do calculations on this, and also apply the emergency brakes.)

 

Unless the system's been turned off in a particular area. Which it was there.

 

Dan

 

 

Shouldn’t the signal in the pocket track (and the interlocking it protects) still work okay without the trip, assuming no SPAD occurred? The union’s account of events only make sense if there was a total failure of the interlocking system, where the train in the pocket track received a proceed aspect.

 

Even if the ATP system failed to detect the train in the pocket track, shouldn’t the failure to properly set the trailing points lead to 123 receiving a danger signal, or the ATP system noticing that the points weren’t set properly for 114?

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Transit control must have lined the facing switch manually, the interlocking would not have allowed two conflicting routes to be set. Even if 123 wasn't there there still would have been an incident and potential derailment if 114 trailed a closed switch. Is there a "sweet spot" where a train can be positioned in the pocket track to not see the signal but still far enough in to not foul the switch?

And it seems like serious oversight if the interlocking can be put into an unsafe configuration with seemingly not a lot of effort (at least with the old system someone would have had to go to track level and tie down the trip arms).

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38 minutes ago, IRT_BMT_IND said:

Transit control must have lined the facing switch manually, the interlocking would not have allowed two conflicting routes to be set. Even if 123 wasn't there there still would have been an incident and potential derailment if 114 trailed a closed switch. Is there a "sweet spot" where a train can be positioned in the pocket track to not see the signal but still far enough in to not foul the switch?

And it seems like serious oversight if the interlocking can be put into an unsafe configuration with seemingly not a lot of effort (at least with the old system someone would have had to go to track level and tie down the trip arms).

I’m referring to the union’s account of events, where the crew of 123 are able to view the signal. For their account to be true, 114 would have trailed a closed switch or the trailing switch would have been moved at the last minute. From the video, I don’t see anything untoward when 114 passes through the switch

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4 hours ago, smallspy said:

Only trip down there would be the blind trip at the end of track in the pocket.

 

The new signalling system doesn't rely on trips. If trains are on the track they are communicating with the signal system, which can activate the emergency brake if it senses something untoward. (The equipment onboard the train can also do calculations on this, and also apply the emergency brakes.)

 

Unless the system's been turned off in a particular area. Which it was there.

Sounds like a recipe for a very large accident with a lot of fatalities.

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2 hours ago, nfitz said:

Sounds like a recipe for a very large accident with a lot of fatalities.

Yes, it's not good that the ATC system seems to have at least one corner case where a SPAD can happen without the train being stopped. Assuming there's nowhere else in the system where this can happen.

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20 hours ago, TTC103 said:

Shouldn’t the signal in the pocket track (and the interlocking it protects) still work okay without the trip, assuming no SPAD occurred? The union’s account of events only make sense if there was a total failure of the interlocking system, where the train in the pocket track received a proceed aspect.

 

Even if the ATP system failed to detect the train in the pocket track, shouldn’t the failure to properly set the trailing points lead to 123 receiving a danger signal, or the ATP system noticing that the points weren’t set properly for 114?

There are still a lot of questions that remain to be answered, as well as differences between the accounts of the TTC and the operating staff that need to be reconciled. As is usually the case, the truth is likely somewhere down the middle.

 

One of the first things that popped up to me however, was that the signalling had been disabled into that pocket. To me, that is a serious no-no. The system has several different ways of knowing where a single train is, via the various communication loops from train-to-central and wayside devices such as axle counters. This is done to account for all sorts of situations, such as the on-board systems of a train not being (fully) operative. Disabling the signal system means that the system no longer knows where the train is, and conversely, the train doesn't know where it is in the system either.

 

And that's what's so dangerous here. The train was allowed to move without knowing what was going on around it - which is exactly what the signal system is designed to prevent.

18 hours ago, nfitz said:

Sounds like a recipe for a very large accident with a lot of fatalities.

Provided the systems are turned on and operating correctly, it isn't. How many people have died in accidents on the SRT or Skytrain? They've used similar signal systems since 1985 and 1986 respectively without issue.

 

Dan

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Was the signal in the pocket track protecting the line actually disabled, and unable to show an aspect? My understanding was that only the ATP system was disabled. My thought is that the position of the trailing switch would have stopped 114 or given 123 a danger signal.

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