General Subway/RT Discussion

[Mark Walton]

6 minutes ago, TTC103 said:

Who is responsible for dispatching the train on the Yellow Line?

All dispatching is handled from the Poste centralisé de commande et contrôle, whose location is kept secret for security reasons.

[Cityflyer]

10 hours ago, Mark Walton said:

All dispatching is handled from the Poste centralisé de commande et contrôle, whose location is kept secret for security reasons.

TTC's dispatch centre is public information though obviously the public cannot go inside it.

Why does STM think theirs are more of a high risk security than TTC's?

[TTC103]

17 hours ago, Mark Walton said:

All dispatching is handled from the Poste centralisé de commande et contrôle, whose location is kept secret for security reasons.

I may not have been specific when asking the question: on the yellow line, who is responsible for door control, and determining if it is safe for the train to depart?

[Flalex72]

23 hours ago, Cityflyer said:

TTC's dispatch centre is public information though obviously the public cannot go inside it.

Why does STM think theirs are more of a high risk security than TTC's?

Many agencies don't publicize the location of their control centres, while also not going to great lengths to hide them. Metrolinx doesn't publicize the location of the GO Transit operations centre, but it's no secret where it is. The COMPASS centre for MTO highway management was previously in an "undisclosed location" but it was no secret that it was at their Downsview office.

[John Oke]

8 hours ago, Flalex72 said:

Many agencies don't publicize the location of their control centres, while also not going to great lengths to hide them. Metrolinx doesn't publicize the location of the GO Transit operations centre, but it's no secret where it is. The COMPASS centre for MTO highway management was previously in an "undisclosed location" but it was no secret that it was at their Downsview office.

Isn’t TTC Transit control at Hillcrest? 

[Mark Walton]

On 6/24/2021 at 3:20 PM, TTC103 said:

I may not have been specific when asking the question: on the yellow line, who is responsible for door control, and determining if it is safe for the train to depart?

Under the old manual system (pre-ATO), as I understand it the motorman initiated the door opening, the guard initiated the closing and leaned out the window for a certain distance à la NYC to make sure no one was being dragged. Not sure if that's still the case.

On 6/25/2021 at 4:45 PM, John Oke said:

Isn’t TTC Transit control at Hillcrest? 

The D.L. Gunn Building - the only one named for a TTC personage who's still alive.

[Archer]

On 6/13/2021 at 11:04 AM, smallspy said:

If the piece of equipment is unequipped, then obviously the signal system will not be able to apply the brakes on it.

 

But all of the TR trains are equipped, as are just about all of the MOW equipment at this point.

 

And so the plan was that the signal system - wayside - was still going to be able to communicate with a train in MAN mode. It is a degraded mode that doesn't allow for full interaction with the signal system, sure, but the idea is that it was still going to be able to enforce the safety limits. If it felt that it was going to overrun its limits, than it would be able to apply the brakes on that train.

 

Yes, coupling and work areas could be an issue with this consideration. That's why the dispatchers were going to have an override, to allow a train in MAN to overrun its limits.

 

Clearer?

 

Dan

I think everyone needs to read this so we're all on the same page: https://www.ttc.ca/About_the_TTC/Commission_reports_and_information/Commission_meetings/2021/June_16/Reports/15_Transit_Systems_Engineering_Osgoode_Interlocking_Incident.pdf.

 

MAN mode is a fully manual mode, even on the TRs - think Emergency Mode on the SRT, as there needs to be a mode where you can override the system completely as an absolute fallback (ie. complete loss of the signal system with trains trapped in tunnels).

When a train is in MAN mode, it reports it's position and speed to the system controller. That's it. There is a speed restriction imposed on the train as well, but I believe that is done by the controller on the train. The ATC system is not able to apply the brakes when a train is in MAN mode regardless of what that train does, which is why there are stringent procedures regarding moving of trains in MAN mode. There are no hard limits in MAN mode; a MAN mode train is capable of violating any limits that might exist (red signals, switches not set for route, occupancy, etc).

A degraded mode (Restricted Mode, RM) does exist, but as far as I know it is not utilized in any capacity. I don't know why it isn't used.

 

Osgoode pocket had some level of ATC as it could see the train when the incident occurred, but couldn't operate it in any of the ATC modes. It wasn't disabled, but it also wasn't fully operational. Because 123 Run was in MAN mode when it violated the interlocking, the system was unable to stop it with a brake application. My understanding is that the system did see 123 Run violate the interlocking with the crossing the axle counters.

In theory, the system could have stopped 114 Run on the mainline as it was in an ATC mode; I don't know if it did try or not. I also don't know if, realistically, it could have stopped 114 Run in time to have avoided a collision, given the momentum these trains have.

[Turtle]

11 hours ago, Archer said:

Osgoode pocket had some level of ATC as it could see the train when the incident occurred, but couldn't operate it in any of the ATC modes. It wasn't disabled, but it also wasn't fully operational. Because 123 Run was in MAN mode when it violated the interlocking, the system was unable to stop it with a brake application. My understanding is that the system did see 123 Run violate the interlocking with the crossing the axle counters.

In theory, the system could have stopped 114 Run on the mainline as it was in an ATC mode; I don't know if it did try or not. I also don't know if, realistically, it could have stopped 114 Run in time to have avoided a collision, given the momentum these trains have.

43km/h uphill, emergency brake application would take less than 200ft. At 50km/h, a comfortable service stop in a level station takes less than 250ft. Emergency Brakes take a little longer to stop the train than a full service brake application, but the uphill grade approaching Osgoode would help.

[MK78]

Some TTC subway scenes from a recent movie Spiral (2021)

I assume that's Bay Station, and Bay Lower?

[GTAmissions1]

1 hour ago, MK78 said:

Some TTC subway scenes from a recent movie Spiral (2021)

I assume that's Bay Station, and Bay Lower?

That is correct. Especially with Bay Lower being used for filming different kinds of films in the past. 

[MK78]

I found it funny they changed the signage and other things, but left the rollsign on "KENNEDY". LOL.

That's the second thing that caught my eye after realizing it was a T1 train.

[Mark Walton]

On 7/11/2021 at 9:35 AM, MK78 said:

I found it funny they changed the signage and other things, but left the rollsign on "KENNEDY". LOL.

That's the second thing that caught my eye after realizing it was a T1 train.

It could have been taken during the May 2010 BD split operation on the Victoria Day weekend while the crossover at St. George was being rebuilt. Trains to the eastern part of the line started from Museum, passed through Lower Bay without stopping, and rejoined the BD line west of Yonge, whence they resumed normal route making all stops to Kennedy. WB they did the reverse, passing through Lower Bay without stopping if signals permitted. If not, they had to wait with the train entirely within the platform area, with doors closed; crews had to announce that to passengers. That was my only experience with Lower Bay, which I find little different from the upper level, apart from being a little narrower and having the different floor coverings that were tested there. (BTW that same weekend the present bus terminal at Victoria Park opened, replacing the previous abomination).

[GTAmissions1]

TTC starts rolling out one-person train operation between Vaughan Metropolitan Centre and St. George on Sunday ONLY which was effective August 1st. From St. George to Finch will continue operating with two person train operation.

7 day operation of one-person train operation between the same stretch will rollout on November 21st. Between Vaughan Metropolitan Centre and St. George. 

Line 3 Scarborough RT has operated with only one train operator on-board since the first day. Line 4 Sheppard since October 2016. Of course the amount of volume on these two lines is a fraction compared to what Line 1 Yonge-University gets. Trying to better manage with technological advancements and reallocating employees elsewhere by increasing the amount of station and subway supervisors. 

http://www.ttc.ca/Riding_the_TTC/OPTO.jsp?fbclid=IwAR1hfUBf97HUDsp3zkzb91m-1Zqp-A91CVZvuRDSq2GBd_lvCKRuzC7VMkQ

[lip]

10 hours ago, GTAmissions1 said:

Trying to better manage with technological advancements and reallocating employees elsewhere by increasing the amount of station and subway supervisors.

In other words, what they are saying is that they are reallocating employees to do absolutely nothing. It's like the more supervisors there are, the more useless service becomes.

[MK78]

On 8/27/2021 at 2:09 PM, GTAmissions1 said:

TTC starts rolling out one-person train operation between Vaughan Metropolitan Centre and St. George on Sunday ONLY which was effective August 1st. From St. George to Finch will continue operating with two person train operation.

7 day operation of one-person train operation between the same stretch will rollout on November 21st. Between Vaughan Metropolitan Centre and St. George. 

Line 3 Scarborough RT has operated with only one train operator on-board since the first day. Line 4 Sheppard since October 2016. Of course the amount of volume on these two lines is a fraction compared to what Line 1 Yonge-University gets. Trying to better manage with technological advancements and reallocating employees elsewhere by increasing the amount of station and subway supervisors. 

http://www.ttc.ca/Riding_the_TTC/OPTO.jsp?fbclid=IwAR1hfUBf97HUDsp3zkzb91m-1Zqp-A91CVZvuRDSq2GBd_lvCKRuzC7VMkQ

It'll be curious how much longer simple nuisance alarms take to clear, since now it's the operator who will have to walk back and forth to communicate with transit control, instead of the guard that can relay information.

Sheppard line is also only 4 car trains, so it's that much shorter.

[smallspy]

8 minutes ago, MK78 said:

It'll be curious how much longer simple nuisance alarms take to clear, since now it's the operator who will have to walk back and forth to communicate with transit control, instead of the guard that can relay information.

Sheppard line is also only 4 car trains, so it's that much shorter.

The TTC found that onboard delays increased by quite literally a fraction of a single percentage point after they went to OPTO on the Sheppard Line, so any increases will likely be almost unnoticeable.

 

Dan

[MK78]

1 minute ago, smallspy said:

The TTC found that onboard delays increased by quite literally a fraction of a single percentage point after they went to OPTO on the Sheppard Line, so any increases will likely be almost unnoticeable.

That may very well be, but its only a 4 car train and there are way fewer passengers like it was mentioned.

Also I wonder when turnbacks happen, the operator now has to walk back to the other side, set up the train for reverse, and go back. So I think that will also slow down significantly. Since the TTC implemented the rear guard position a few years ago now, the turnbacks are very quick, having seen a number of them like at Vic Park, you see the train stop at the turnback location, and the forward headlights come on and almost immediately it travels back over a crossover once they get their light.

Also the radio frequently goes out where the operator can't communicate with transit control, but he can communicate with the guard, who can relay information during a mechanical issue or a signal issue, etc... I've heard number of comms like that where the guard is acting as a proxy.

[TTC103]

15 hours ago, MK78 said:

That may very well be, but its only a 4 car train and there are way fewer passengers like it was mentioned.

Also I wonder when turnbacks happen, the operator now has to walk back to the other side, set up the train for reverse, and go back. So I think that will also slow down significantly. Since the TTC implemented the rear guard position a few years ago now, the turnbacks are very quick, having seen a number of them like at Vic Park, you see the train stop at the turnback location, and the forward headlights come on and almost immediately it travels back over a crossover once they get their light.

Also the radio frequently goes out where the operator can't communicate with transit control, but he can communicate with the guard, who can relay information during a mechanical issue or a signal issue, etc... I've heard number of comms like that where the guard is acting as a proxy.

Most agencies put a second operator on when a train needs to be reversed quickly, but that is only an argument for doing in those specific situations. A The vast majority of the time one person is enough.

 

most agencies that need to turn around trains quickly (such as STM) only put two operators on when the procedure needs to be done, and take one off once the train has been reversed.

[MK78]

7 hours ago, TTC103 said:

Most agencies put a second operator on when a train needs to be reversed quickly, but that is only an argument for doing in those specific situations. A The vast majority of the time one person is enough.

most agencies that need to turn around trains quickly (such as STM) only put two operators on when the procedure needs to be done, and take one off once the train has been reversed.

That may make sense when it's a planned closure that requires turnbacks, but how do you add extra operators for reversing when it's a long delay like a track level incident where its like 2 hours before service is restored?

I guess they factor all this in.

[TTC103]

On 8/31/2021 at 2:49 PM, MK78 said:

That may make sense when it's a planned closure that requires turnbacks, but how do you add extra operators for reversing when it's a long delay like a track level incident where its like 2 hours before service is restored?

I guess they factor all this in.

When you have a disruption, there will be a surplus of operators available. It may take a bit longer, but shouldn't be a big issue.

 

In any case, I'm happy that the TTC is taking steps to improve the subway. Staff will not be required to ride on the exterior of the train, which is a huge Health & Safety improvement.

[MK78]

40 minutes ago, TTC103 said:

In any case, I'm happy that the TTC is taking steps to improve the subway. Staff will not be required to ride on the exterior of the train, which is a huge Health & Safety improvement.

How do the staff ride on the exterior?

[Orion VI]

4 minutes ago, MK78 said:

How do the staff ride on the exterior?

I would assume he means when the conductors stick their heads out of the windows as the train departs, but personally I don't see how that's a health and safety risk, but ok.

[TTC103]

2 minutes ago, MK78 said:

How do the staff ride on the exterior?

 

2 minutes ago, Orion VI said:

I would assume he means when the conductors stick their heads out of the windows as the train departs, but personally I don't see how that's a health and safety risk, but ok.

 

The TTC does not require the guard to bring their body into the train before signalling to the operator that it is safe to start. During that time, they are in a vulnerable position where they could be assaulted by a customer angry that they didn't hold the doors, or where they could be hit by an object. In the NY subway, a conductor was killed about 18 years ago after being struck by a metal gate at the end of a platform. Where I live now, in continental Europe, it is not permitted for any employee to stick their body parts outside a train that is moving or about to move.

https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/19/nyregion/leaning-out-of-train-a-subway-conductor-hits-her-head-and-dies.html

[MK78]

Yeah i dunno how that could happen here on the TTC, except deliberately. By the time the guard's car passes the end of the station its going at a pretty good clip. I really don't see many guards sticking their heads out for very long at all, usually when the doors close they close their window and the train moves off.

[TTC103]

11 minutes ago, MK78 said:

Yeah i dunno how that could happen here on the TTC, except deliberately. By the time the guard's car passes the end of the station its going at a pretty good clip. I really don't see many guards sticking their heads out for very long at all, usually when the doors close they close their window and the train moves off.

In the incident on the NY subway, the train travelled 300 feet (the length of a line 4 train) before the contact with the gate. It just takes someone losing focus in the moment. I doubt that that train conductor wanted to die on the job.

 

The assault issue is very real risk. The most common situation for an assault to occur to a member of train staff is during dispatch.